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Abstract
Type-two constructions abound in cryptography: adversaries for encryption and authen-
tication schemes, if active, are modelled as algorithms having access to oracles, i.e. as second-
order algorithms. But how about making cryptographic schemes themselves higher-order?
This paper gives an answer to this question, by first describing why higher-order cryptog-
raphy is interesting as an object of study, then showing how the concept of probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm can be generalised so as to encompass algorithms of order strictly
higher than two, and finally proving some positive and negative results about the existence
of higher-order cryptographic primitives, namely authentication schemes and pseudorandom
functions.
1 Introduction
Higher-order computation generalizes classic first-order one by allowing algorithms and functions
to not only take strings but also functions in input. It is well-known that this way of computing
gives rise to an interesting computability and complexity theory [16, 15, 20], and that it also
constitutes a conceptual basis for the functional programming paradigm, in which higher-order
subroutines allow for a greater degree of modularity and conciseness in programs.
In cryptography [11, 18, 14], computation is necessarily randomized, and being able to re-
strict the time complexity of adversaries is itself crucial: most modern cryptographic schemes are
unsecure against computationally unbounded adversaries. Noticeably, higher-order constructions
are often considered in cryptography, in particular when modeling active adversaries, which have
access to oracles for the underlying encryption, decription, or authentication functions, and can
thus naturally be seen as second-order algorithms.
Another example of useful cryptographic constructions which can be spelled out at different
type orders, are pseudorandom primitives. Indeed, pseudorandomness can be formulated on (fam-
ilies of) strings, giving rise to so-called pseudorandom generators [2], but also on (families of)
first-order functions, giving rise to the so-called pseudorandom functions [12]. In the former case,
adversaries (i.e., distinguishers) are ordinary polynomial time algorithms, while in the latter case,
they are polytime oracle machines.
Given the above, it is natural to wonder whether standard primitives like encryption, authen-
tication, hash functions, or pseudorandom functions, could be made higher-order. As discussed in
Section 2 below, that would represent a way of dealing with code-manipulating programs and their
security in a novel, fundamentally interactive, way. Before even looking at the feasibility of this
goal, there is one obstacle we are facing, which is genuinely definitional: how could we even give
notions of security (e.g. pseudorandomness, unforgeability, and the like) for second-order func-
tions, given that those definitions would rely on a notion of third-order probabilistic polynomial
time adversary, itself absent from the literature? Indeed, although different proposals exist for
classes of feasible deterministic functionals [5, 15], not much is known if the underlying algorithm
has access to a source of randomness. Moreover, the notion of feasibility used in cryptography is
based on the so-called security parameter, a global numerical parameter which controls the com-
plexity of all the involved parties. In Section 3, we give a definition of higher-order probabilistic
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polynomial time by way of concepts borrowed from game semantics [13, 1], and being inspired
by recent work by Fere´e [8]. We give evidence to the fact that the provided definition is general
enough to capture a broad class of adversaries of order strictly higher than two.
After having introduced the model, we take a look at whether any concrete instance of a secure
higher-order cryptographic primitive can be given. The results we provide are about pseudoran-
domness functions and their application to authentication. We prove on the one hand that those
constructions are not possible, at least if one insists on them to have the expected type (see Sec-
tion 4.2). On the other hand, we prove (in Section 4.3 below) that second-order pseduorandomness
is possible if the argument function takes as input a string of logarithmic length.
2 The Why and How of Encrypting or Authenticating Func-
tions
Encryption and authentication, arguably the two simplest cryptographic primitives, are often
applied to programs rather than mere data. But when this is done, programs are treated as
ordinary data, i.e., as strings of symbols. In particular, two different but equivalent programs are
seen as different strings, and their encryptions or authentication tags can be completely different
objects. It is natural to ask the following: would it be possible to deal with programs as functions
and not as strings, in a cryptographic scenario? Could we, e.g., encrypt or authenticate programs
seeing them as black boxes, thus without any access to their code?
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the program P we deal with has a very simple IO
behaviour, i.e. it takes an input a binary string of length n and returns a boolean. Authenticating
it could in principle be done by querying P on some of its inputs and, based on the outputs to
the queries, compute a tag for P. As usual, such an authenticating scheme would be secure if no
efficient adversary A could produce a tag for P without knowing the underlying secret key k (such
that |k| = n) with non-negligible probability. Please notice that the adversary, contrarily to the
scheme itself, will have access to the code of P, even if that code has not been used during the
authenticating process.
But how could security can be defined in a setting like the above? The three entities at hand
have the following types, where MAC is the authentication algorithm being defined, S = {0, 1}∗ is
the set of binary strings, and B = {0, 1} is the set of boolean values:
P : S→ B MAC : S→ (S→ B)→ S A : ((S→ B)→ S)→ (S→ B)× S
The first argument of MAC is the key k, which is of course not passed to the adversary A. The
latter can query MACk and produce a tagged message, and whose type, as expected, is third-order.
The above is not an accurate description of the input-output behaviour of the involved algorithm,
and in particular of the fact that length of the input string to P might be in a certain relation to
the length of k, i.e., the underlying security parametery. Reflecting all this in the types is however
possible by replacing occurrences of the type S with refinements of it, as follows:
P : S[n]→ B
MAC : S[n]→ (S[r(n)]→ B)→ S[p(n)]
A : ((S[r(n)]→ B)→ S[p(n)])→ (S[r(n)]→ B)× S[p(n)]
But how could the time complexity of the three algorithms above be defined? While polynomial
time computability for the function P and the authentication MAC can be captured in a standard way
using, e.g., oracle Turing machines, the same cannot be said about A. How to, e.g., appropriately
account for the time A needs to “cook” a function f in S[n] → B to be passed to its argument
functional? So, appealing as it is, our objective of studying higher-order forms of cryptography is
bound to be nontrivial, even from a purely definitional point of view.
The contributions of this paper can be now described at a more refined level of detail, as
follows:
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• On the one hand, we give a definition of a polynomial-time higher-order probabilistic algo-
rithm whose time complexity depends on a global security parameter and which is captured
by games and strategies, in line with game semantics [13, 1]. This allows to discriminate
satisfactorily between efficient and non-efficient adversaries, and accounts for the complexity
of first-and-second-order algorithms consistently with standard complexity theory.
• On the other hand, we give some positive and negative results about the possibility of
designing second-order cryptographic primitives, and in particular pseudorandom functions
and authentication schemes. In particular we prove, by an essentially information-theoretic
argument, that secure deterministic second-order authentication schemes cannot exist. A
simple and direct reduction argument shows that a more restricted form of pseudorandom
function exists under standard cryptographic assumptions. Noticeably, the adversaries we
prove the existence of are of a very restricted form, while the ones which we prove impossible
to build are quite general.
3 Higher-Order Probabilistic Polynomial Time Through Parametrized
Games
In this section, we introduce a framework inspired by game semantics in which one can talk about
the efficiency of probabilistic higher-order programs in presence of a global security parameter.
While the capability of interpreting higher-order programs is a well-established feature of game
semantics, dealing at the same time with probabilistic behavior and efficiency constraints has—to
the best of the authors’ knowledge—not been considered so far. The two aspects have however
been tackled independently. Several game models of probabilistic languages have been introduced:
we can cite here for instance the fully abstract model of probabilistic Idealized Algol by Danos
and Harmer [7], or the model of probabilistic PCF by Clairambault at al. [4]. About efficiency,
we can cite the work by Fe´re´e [8] on higher-order complexity and game semantics, in which the
cost of evaluating higher-order programs is measured parametrically on the size of all their inputs,
including functions, thus in line with type-two complexity [5]. We are instead interested in the
efficiency of higher-order definitions with respect to the security parameter. Unfortunately, existing
probabilistic game models do not behave well when restricted to capture feasibility: polytime
computable probabilistic strategies in the spirit of Danos and Harmer do not compose (see the
Extended Version of this paper for more details).
Contrary to most works on game semantics, we do not aim at building a model of a particular
programming language, but we take game semantics as our model of compuation. As a conse-
quence, we are not bound by requirements to model particular programming features or to reflect
their discriminating power.
We present our game-based model of computation in three steps: first we define a category
of deterministic games and strategies called PG—for parametrized games—which capture com-
putational agents whose behavior is parametrized by the security parameter. This model ensures
that the agent are total : they always answer any request by the opponent. In a second step, we
introducePPG , as a sub-category ofPG designed to model those agents whose time complexity
is polynomially bounded with respect to the security parameter. Finally, we deal with randomized
agents by allowing them to interact with a probabilistic oracle, that outputs (a bounded amount
of) random bits.
3.1 Parametrized Deterministic Games
Our game model has been designed so as to be able to deal with security properties that—as
exemplified by computational indistinguishability—are expressed by looking at the behavior of
adversaries at the limit, i.e., when the security parameter tends towards infinity. The agents we
consider are actually families of functions, indexed by the security parameter. As such, our game
model can be seen as a parametrized version of Wolverson’s simple games [21], where the set of
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plays is replaced by a family of sets of plays, indexed by the natural numbers. Moreover, we require
the total length of any interaction between the involved parties to be polynomially bounded in
the security parameter.
We need a few preliminary definitions before delving into the . Given two sets X and Y ,
we define Alt(X,Y ) as {(a1, . . . , an) | ai ∈ X if i is odd, ai ∈ Y if i is even}, i.e., as the set of
finite alternating sequences whose first element is in X. Given any set of sequences X, Odd(X)
(respectively, Even(X)) stands for the subset of X containing the sequences of odd (respectively,
even) length. From now on, we implicitly assume that any (opponent or player) move m can
be faithfully encoded as a string in an appropriate, fixed alphabet. This way, moves and plays
implicitly have a length, that we will note |·|. We fix a set Pol of unary polynomially-bounded total
functions on the natural numbers, which includes the identity ι, base-2 logarithm dlge, addition,
multiplication, and closed by composition. Pol can be equipped with the pointwise partial order:
p ≤ q when ∀n ∈ N, p(n) ≤ q(n).
Definition 1 (Parametrized Games). A parametrized game G = (OG,PG,LG) consists of sets
OG, PG of opponent and player moves, respectively, together with a family of non-empty prefix-
closed sets LG = {LnG}n∈N, where LnG ⊆ Alt(OG,PG), such that there is p ∈ Pol with ∀n ∈ N.∀s ∈
LnG.|s| ≤ p(n). The union of OG and PG is indicated as MG.
For every n ∈ N, LnG represents the set of legal plays, when n is the current value of the security
parameter. Observe that the first move is always played by the opponent, and that for any fixed
value of the security parameter n, the length of legal plays is bounded by p(n), where p ∈ Pol.
Example 2 (Ground Games). We present here some games designed to model data-types in our
computation model. The simplest game is probably the unit game 1 = ({?}, {∗}, {Ln1}n∈N) with
just one opponent move and one player move, where Ln1 = {ε, ?, ?∗} for every n. Just slightly
more complicated than the unit game is the boolean game B in which the two moves 0 and 1 take
the place of ∗. In the two games introduced so far, parameterisation is not really relevant, since
LnG◦ = L
m
G◦ for every n,m ∈ N. The latter is not true in S[p] = ({?}, {0, 1}?, {LnS[p]}n∈N) with
LnS[p] = {ε, ?} ∪ {?s | |s| = p(n)}, which will be our way of capturing strings. A slight variation of
S[p] is L[p] in which the returned string can have length smaller or equal to p(n).
Example 3 (Oracle Games). As another example, we describe how to construct polynomial
boolean oracles as games. For every polynomial p ∈ Pol we define a game Op as Op = ({?}, {0, 1}, {LnOp}n∈N)
with
LnOp = {?} ∪ {?b1?b2 . . .?bm | bi ∈ {0, 1} ∧m ≤ p(n)} ∪ {?b1?b2 . . .?bm? | bi ∈ {0, 1} ∧m < p(n)}.
Our oracle games are actually a special case of a more general construction, that consists of
taking any game G, and a polynomial p, and to build a game which consists in playing p(n) times
with the game G.
Definition 4 (Bounded Exponentials). Let G = (OG,PG,LG) be a parametrized game. For every
p ∈ Pol, we define a new parametrized game !pG := (O!pG,P!pG,L!pG) as follows:
• O!pG = N×OG, and P!pG = N× PG;
• For n ∈ N, Ln!pG is the set of those plays s ∈ Alt(O!pG,P!pG) such that:
– for every i, the i-th projection si of s is in L
n
G.
– if a move (i+ 1, z) appears in s, then a move (i,x) appears at some earlier point of s,
and i+ 1 ≤ p(n).
Observe that the game Op is isomorphic to the game !pB—we can build a bijection between
legals plays having the same length.
Games specify how agents could play in a certain interactive scenario. As such, they do not
represent one such agent, this role being the one of strategies. Indeed, a strategy on a game is
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precisely a way of specifying a deterministic behavior of the player, i.e. how the player is going to
answer to any possible behavior of an adversary. We moreover ask our strategies to be total, in
the sense that the player cannot refuse to play when it is their turn.
Definition 5 (Strategies). A strategy on a parametrized game G = (OG,PG,LG) consists of a
family f = {fn}n∈N, where fn is a partial function from Odd(LnG) to PG such that:
• for every s ∈ Odd(LnG), if fn(s) = x is defined, then sx ∈ LnG;
• sxy ∈ Dom(fn) implies that x = fn(s);
• s ∈ fn ∧ sx ∈ LnG ⇒ sx ∈ Dom(fn).
If f is a strategy, we define the set of plays caracterising f, that we note f, as the family {fn} where
fn = {ε} ∪ {sfn(s) | s ∈ Dom(f)} ⊆ LnG.
Any strategy f is entirely caracterized by its set of plays f. Intuitively, a strategy stands for a
deterministic recipe that informs the player on how to respond to any behavior of the opponent.
As such, it does not need to be effective.
Up to now, the games we have described are such that their strategies are meant to represent
concrete data: think about how a strategy for, e.g., B or even Op could look like. It is now time
to build games whose strategies are functions, this being the following construction on games:
Definition 6 (Constructing Functional Games). The game G( H is given as OG(H = PG+OH ,
PG(H = OG + PH , and LG(H = {s ∈ Alt(OG(H ,PG(H) | s0 ∈ LG, s1 ∈ LH}.
Example 7. As an example, we look at the game Op( S[p], which captures functions returning
a string of size p(n) after having queried a binary oracle at most p(n) times. First, observe that:
Op( S[p] = ({?S[p], 0, 1}, {?Op} ∪ {0, 1}?, (LO
p(S[p]
n )n∈N),
where L
Op(S[p]
n is generated by the following grammar:
q ∈ LOp(S[p]n ::=?S[p] | ?S[p]o | ?S[p]e | ?S[p]es s ∈ {0, 1}? with |s| ≤ p(n)
e ::=  | ?Opb1 . . .?Opbm o ::=?Op | ?Opb1 . . .?Opbm−1?Op bi ∈ {0, 1},m ≤ p(n)
Of course there are many strategies for this game, and we just describe two of them here which
both make use of the oracle: the first one—that we will call once asks for a random boolean to the
oracle, and when this boolean is 0, returns the string 0n, and returns the string 1n otherwise. It
is represented in Figure 1a. The second strategy—denoted mult, and represented in Figure 1b—
generates a random key of length p(n) by making p(n) calls to the probabilistic oracle.
Example 8. In this example, we look at the way of weakening our probabilistic oracle: more
precisely, if we have an oracle that makes available p(n) booleans–for each value of the security
parameter n–then we can build from it an oracle that gives only q(n) booleans, when q ≤ p, by
taking only the q(n) first iteration of our original oracle. We do this construction formally in a
slighlty more general setting: for any game G ∈ SG, we build a canonical strategy wGq,p on the
game !pG(!qG.
We now look at how to compose strategies: given a strategy on G( H, and H ( K, we want
to build a strategy on G( K that combines them. We define composition as in [21], except that
we need to take also in count the security parameter n.
Definition 9 (Composition of Strategies). Let G,H,K be parametrized games, and let f, g be two
strategies on G( H and H ( K respectively. We first define the set of interaction sequences of
f and g as:
(f 9 g)n = {s ∈ (MG +MH +MK)? | s G,H∈ fn ∧ s H,K∈ gn},
From there, we define the composition of f and g as the unique strategy f; g such that:
f; gn = {s G,K | s ∈ (f 9 g)n}.
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Op ( S[p]
O
O
?S[p]
b
P ?Op
P bn
(a) The strategy once.
Op ( S[p]
O ?S[p]
P ?Op
O b1
P ?Op
O b2
...
P b1 . . . bp(n)
(b) The strategy mult
Figure 1: Two different strategies on the game Op( S[p]
We can check that f; g is indeed a strategy on A( C, and that moreover the composition seen
as an operation on strategies is associative and admits an identity. We cat thus define PG as the
category whose objects are parametrized games, and whose set of morphisms PG (G,H) consists
of the parametrized strategies on the game G( H.
3.2 Polynomially Bounded Parametrized Games
Parametrized games have been defined so as to have polynomially bounded length. However,
there is no guarantee on the effectiveness of strategies, i.e., that the next player move, can be
computed algorithmically from the history, uniformly in the security parameter. This can be
however tackled by considering a subcategory ofPG in which strategies are not merely functions,
but can be computed efficiently:
Definition 10 (Polytime Computable Strategies). Let G a parametrized game in PG , and f be a
strategy on G. We say that f is polytime computable when there exists a polynomial time Turing
machine which on the entry (1n, s) returns f(n)(s).
All strategies we have given as examples in the previous section are polytime computable. For
example, the two strategies from Example 7 are both computable in linear time.
Proposition 11 (Stability of Polytime Computable Strategies). Let G,H,K be polynomially
bounded games. If f, g are polytime computable strategies, respectively on G( H, and H ( K,
then f; g is itself a polytime computable strategy.
We cat thus write PPG for the the sub-category of PG whose objects are paramterized
games, and whose morphisms are polytime computable strategies.
Let us now consider MAC from Section 2. Its type can be turned into the parametrized game
S[ι] (!q(S[ι] ( B) ( S[p]. The bounded exponential !q serves to model the fact that the
argument function can be accessed a number of times which is polynomially bounded on n. As
a consequence, MAC can only query the argument function a number of times which is negligibly
smaller than the number of possible queries, itself exponential in n. As we will see in Section 4,
this is the crux in proving security of such a message authentication code to be unatteinable.
3.3 Probabilistic Strategies
Both in PG and in PPG , strategies on any game G are purely functions, and the way they
react to stimuli from the environment is completely deterministic. How could we reconcile all this
with our claim that the framework we are introducing adequately model probabilistic higher-order
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computation? Actually, one could be tempted to define a notion of probabilistic strategy in which
the underlying function family {fn}n∈N is such that fn returns a probability distribution fn(s) of
player moves when fed with the history s. This, however, would lead to some technical problems
when composing strategies: it would be hard to keep the composition of two efficient strategies
itself efficient.
It turns out that a much more convenient route consists, instead, in defining a probabilistic
strategy on G simply as a deterministic polytime strategy on Op ( G, namely as an ordinary
strategy having access to polynomially many random bits. Actually, we have already encountered
strategies of this kind, namely once and mult from Example 7. This will be our way of modeling
higher-order probabilistic computations.
Definition 12. Let f be a strategy on the game Op ( B. For every b ∈ B, we define the
probability of observing b when executing f as follows:
Pr(f ⇓n b) =
∑
(b1,...,bk)∈Bk
with (?B·?Op ·b1...?Op ·bk·b)∈(f)n
1
2k
Given a probabilistic strategy f on G (i.e. a strategy on Oq ( G) and p ∈ Pol, we indicate
as !pf the strategy in which p(n) copies of f are played, but in which randomness is resolved just
once and for all, i.e. !pf is a strategy on O
q (!pG
We want now to be able to observe the result of a computation. Similarly to what is done for
instance in [21], we observe only at ground types: for instance for the type Bool, the observables
will be a pair (p0, p1), where p0 is the probability that the program returns false, and p1 the
probability that the program returns true. In our model, the ground types are those games where
the only legal plays are the initial question by the opponent, followed by a terminal answer of the
player.
Definition 13. Let G a game in SG. We say that G is observable when for every n ∈ N:
LnG ⊆ {?G} ∪ {?Gr | r ∈ PG}.
Observe that the games B and S[p] that we considered in Example 2 are indeed observable
games. However, it is not the case of the game build using the ( construct, for instance S[p](
S[2p].
Recall that in our framework, a probabilistic program of some ground type G is actually
represented by a strategy f on the game Op( G, for some polynomials p. At this point, it should
be noted that this polynomial p is somehow arbitrary, since if we take a polynomial q ≥ p, we
can easily transform f in a strategy on Oq ( G, using the strategy on Oq ( Op highlighted in
Example ??. In order to recover information about the probabilistic behavior of the program, we
compute the probability that the return value will be r: to do that we look at all the possible
sequences of booleans outputed by the oracle that lead to the player returnin r under the strategy
f, and then we suppose that those sequences are uniformly distributed, in a probabilistic sense.
Definition 14. Let G be an observable game, and f a strategy on the game Op ( G. For any
r ∈ PG, we define the probability of observing r when executing f as the function Probf(r) : N→
[0, 1] such that
n 7→
∑
k≤p(n)
∑
(b1,...,bk)∈{0,1}k
with (?·?B·b1...?B·bk·r)∈(f)n
(
1
2
)k
Observe that if f is a strategy on Op ( f, and wq,p the canonical strategy on Oq ( Op–
as defined in Example ??, then for every value r, Probf(r) = Probwq,p;f(r): it means that the
probability of observing r is independant of the choice of the polynomial oracle–as soon as it
produces at least as many random booleans as asked by the agent.
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4 The (In)feasibility of Higher-Order Cryptography
In this section, we will give both negative and positive results about the possibility of defining a
deterministic polytime strategy for the game S[ι] (!q(S[r] ( B) ( S[p] which could be used
to authenticate functions. When r is linear, this is provably impossible, as proved in Section 4.2
below. When, instead, r is logarithmic (and q is at least linear), a positive result can be given,
see Section 4.3.
!q(S[r] ( B) ( S[p]
O ?S[p]
P (1, ?B)
O (1, ?S[r])
P (1, s1)
O (1, t1)
...
P (m, ?B)
O (m, ?S[r])
P (m, sm)
O (m, tm)
P v
Figure 2: Plays (of maximal length) for the game
!q(S[r]( B)( S[p]
But how would a strategy for the game
!q(S[r] ( B) ( S[p] look like? Plays for
this game are as in Figure 2. A strategy
for such a game is required to determine the
value of the query si+1 ∈ S[r(n)] based on
t1, . . . , ti ∈ B. Moreover, based on t1, . . . , tm
(where m ≤ q(n)), the strategy should be able
to produce the value v ∈ S[p(n)]. Strictly
speaking, the strategy should also be able to
respond to a situation in which the opponent
directly replies to a move (i, ?B) by way of a
truth value (i, ti), without querying the argu-
ment. This is however a signal that the agent
with which the strategy is interacting repre-
sents a constant function, and we will not con-
sider it in the following.
The way we will prove authentication im-
possible when r is linear consists in showing
that since q is polynomially bounded (thus
negligibly smaller than the number of possible
queries of type S[r] any function is allowed to
make to its argument), there are many argu-
ment functions S[r(n)]→ B which are indistinguishable, and would thus receive the same tag. In
Section 4.2, we prove that the (relatively few) influential coordinates can be efficiently determined.
4.1 Efficiently Determining Influential Variables
A key step towards proving our negative result comes from the theory of influential variables in
decision trees. In this section, we are going to give some preliminary definitions about it, without
any aim at being comprehensive (see, e.g., [19]).
The theory of influential variables is concerned with boolean functions, and with their statistical
properties. The first definitions we need, then, are those of variance and influence (from now on,
metavariables like N ,M ,L stand for natural number unrelated to the security parameter, unless
otherwise specified). Given a natural number N ∈ N, [N ] denotes the set {1, . . . ,N}. Whenever
j ∈ [N ], ej ∈ S[N ] is the sequence which is everywhere 0 except on the j-th component, in which
it is 1.
Definition 15 (Variance and Influence). For every distribution D over S[N ], and F : S[N ]→ B,
we write VarD(F ) for the value E(F (D)2) − E(F (D))2 = Prx,y∼D(F (x) 6= F (y)), called the
variance of F under D. For every distribution D over S[N ], F : S[N ]→ B, and j ∈ [N ], we define
the influence of j on F under D, written Inf jD(F ), as Prx∼D[F (x) 6= F (x⊕ ej)].
The quantity Inf jD(F ) measures how much, on the average, changing the j-th input to F
influences its output. If F does not depend too much on the j-th input, then Inf jD(F ) is close to
0, while it is close to 1 when switching the j-th input has a strong effect on the output.
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Example 16. Let PARITY N : S[N ]→ B be the parity function on N bits. It holds that
Inf jD(PARITY N ) = Pr
x∼D
[PARITY N (x) 6= PARITY N (x⊕ ej)]
=
∑
x
D(x) · |PARITY N (x)− PARITY N (x⊕ ej)| =
∑
x
D(x) = 1
If F : A → S[L], and t ∈ [L], we define Ft : A → B to be the function that on input x ∈ A
outputs the t-th bit of F (x).
The kind of distributions over S[N ] we will be mainly interested are the so-called semi-uniform
ones, namely those in which some of the N bits have a fixed value, while the others take all possible
values with equal probability. It is thus natural to deal with them by way of partial functions. For
every partial function g : [N ] ⇀ B we define Dom(g) ⊆ [N ] to be the set of inputs on which g is
defined, and Ug to be the uniform distribution of x over S[N ] conditioned on xj = g(j) for every
j ∈ Dom(g), i.e., the distribution defined as follows:
Ug(x) =
{
1
2N−|Dom(g)| if xj = g(j) for every j ∈ Dom(g);
0 otherwise.
If a distribution D can be written as Ug, where g : [N ] ⇀ B, we say that D is an Dom(g)-
distribution, or a semi-uniform distribution. Given a distribution D : S[N ] → R[0,1], some index
j ∈ [N ] and a bit b ∈ B, the expression D[j ← b] stands for the conditioning of D to the fact that
the j-th boolean argument is b. Note that if D is an S-distribution and j ∈ [N ] \S, then D[j ← b]
is an S ∪ {j}-distribution.
A crucial concept in the following is that of a decision tree, which is a model of computation for
boolean functions in which the interactive aspects are put upfront, while the merely computational
aspects are somehow abstracted away.
Definition 17 (Decision Tree). Given a function F , a decision tree T for R is a finite ordered
binary tree:
• Whose internal nodes are labelled with an index i ∈ [N ].
• Whose leaves are labelled with a bit b ∈ B.
• Such that whenever a path ending in a leaf labelled with b is consistent with x ∈ S[N ], it
holds that F (x) = b.
The depth of any decision tree T is defined as for any tree.
Example 18. An example of a decision tree that computes the function PARITY 3 : S[3] → B
defined in Example 16 can be found in Figure 3.
0 1 0 0 11 1 0
1
2 2
3 3 3 3
Figure 3: A decision tree for PARITY 3
The following result, which is an easy
corollary of some well-known result in the lit-
erature, allows to put the variance and the
influence in relation whenever the underlying
function can be computed by way of a decision
tree of limited depth.
Lemma 19. Suppose that F is computable
by a decision tree of depth at most q and g :
[N ] → B is a partial function. Then there
exists j ∈ [N ] \Dom(g) such that
Inf jUg (F ) ≥
VarUg (F )
q
Proof. This is basically corollary of Corollary 1.2 from [19].
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Every decision tree T makes on any input a certain number of queries, which of course can be
different for different inputs. If D is a distribution, S is a subset of [N ] and T is a decision tree,
we define ∆D,S(T ) as the expectation over x ∼ D of the number of queries that T makes on input
x outside of S, which is said to be the average query complexity of T on D and S. The following
result relates the query complexity before and after the underlying semi-uniform distribution is
updated: if we fix the value of a variable, then the average interactive complexity goes down (on
the average) by at least the influence of the variable:
Lemma 20. For every decision tree T computing a function F , S ⊆ [N ], j ∈ [N ] \ S, and
S-distribution D, it holds that
1
2∆D[j←0],S∪{j}(T ) +
1
2∆D[j←1],S∪{j}(T ) ≤ ∆D,S(T )− Inf jD(F )
Proof. We start by showing that
∆D,S∪{j}(T ) ≤ ∆D,S(T )− Inf jD(F ) (1)
For every L ∈ [N ], let IL be the random variable that is equal to one if L is queried by T on
x ∼ D and equal to 0 otherwise. Therefore we can rewrite (1) as∑
L6∈S∪{j}
E(IL) ≤
∑
L 6∈S
E(IL)− Inf jD(F )
or
E(Ij) ≥ Inf jD(F ) . (2)
But for every x on which j is not queried by the tree T , T (x) = T (x⊕ ej). Hence if j is influential
w.r.t. x then certainly j is queried, and (2) follows. For obvious reasons D = 12D[j ← 0]+ 12D[j ←
1] and so in particular
∆D,S∪{j}(T ) = 12∆D[j←0],S∪{j}(T ) +
1
2∆D[j←1],S∪{j}(T )
from which the thesis easily follows, given (1).
By somehow iterating over Lemma 20, we can get the following result, which states that fixing
enough coordinates, the variance can be made arbitrarily low, and that those coordinates can be
efficiently determined:
Theorem 21. For every F : S[N ] → S[L] such that for every t ∈ [L], Ft is computable by a
decision tree of depth ≤ q, and every ε > 0, there exist a natural number m ≤ Lq2/ε and a partial
function g : [N ]→ B where |Dom(g)| ≤ m such that
VarUg (Ft) ≤ ε (3)
for every t ∈ {1, . . . ,L}. Moreover, there is an polytime randomized algorithm A that on input F ,
δ > 0, and ε > 0, makes at most O(LN) · poly(q/(δε)) queries to F and outputs such a partial
function g with |Dom(g)| ≤ O((Lq2)/(εδ)) with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. For every t ∈ [L] let Tt be a tree computing Ft and having depth at most q. The algorithm
A works as follows:
Algorithm A(F , ε, δ) :
1. i← 0;
2. g0 ← ∅;
3. D0 ← Ug0 ;
4. γ ← δ/(NLq2/(δε))
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5. For every t ∈ [L], perform vt ← EstimateVar(Di,Ft, ε/3, γ);
6. If for every t ∈ [L], it holds that vt ≤ (2/3)ε, then return gi, otherwise continue.
7. Let t↑ be a t such that vt ≥ 2ε/3;
8. For every j ∈ [N ], perform nj ← EstimateInf(Di,Ft↑ , ε/(10q), γ);
9. Let j be such that nj ≥ 0.2 · ε/q;
10. b← {0, 1};
11. gi+1 ← gi ∪ {(j, b)};
12. Di+1 ← Ugi+1 ;
13. i← i+ 1.
14. Go back to 5.
The algorithm can be studied in two steps:
• We first of all analyse the complexity of the algorithm A. An analysis of the runtime gives
us the following result:
Proposition 22. The number of times Algorithm A executes its main loop is, in expectation,
at most O(Lq2/ε).
Proof. We define the potential function
ϕ(i) =
L∑
t=1
∆Di,s(gi)(Tt)
where Tt is the tree computing Ft. The algorithm does not of course have access to this
tree but this potential function is only used in the analysis. Initially, we are guaranteed that
ϕ(0) ≤ Lq and by definition ϕ(i) ≥ 0 for every i. Hence to show that we end in expected
number of steps O(Lq2/ε) it is enough to show that in expectation
E[ϕ(i)− ϕ(i+ 1)] ≥ Ω(ε/q)
for every step i in which we do not stop. Indeed, let i be such a step and let t0 be the index
such that our estimate for V ar(Ft0(Di)) ≥ (2/3)ε and j0 the influential variable for Ft0 dud
we find. Recall that gi+1 is obtained by extending gi to satisfy gi+1(j0) = b for a random
b ∈ B. For every t 6= t0, the expectation over b of ∆Di+1,s(gi+1)(Tt) is equal to the expected
number of queries that Tt makes on Di that do not touch the set s(gi) ∪ {j}. This number
can only be smaller than ∆Di,s(gi)(Tt). For t = t0, by Lemma 20, E[∆Di+1,s(gi+1)(Ft)] ≤
E[∆Di+1,s(gi+1)(Ft)] + Ω(ε/q). Hence, in expectation ϕ(i + 1) is smaller than ϕ(i) by an
additive factor of Ω(ε/q) which is what we wanted to prove.
• A further discussion is needed to ensure that the desired level of accuracy is actually attained
by the algorithm. The reason why γ is set to δ/T (where T = O(NLq2/(δε)) is our bound
on the number of times we need to use these estimates) is to ensure γ to be small enough so
that we can take a union bound over the chances that any of our estimates fail. Thus the
algorithm will only stop when it reach Di = Ugi for which the variance of Ft is smaller than
ε for every t ∈ [L].
• Once we have Proposition 22, the theorem follows by noting that if the expected number of
iterations of the main loop is m, the probability that we make more than m/δ iterations is
at most δ. (Since the potential function undergoes a biased random walk, a more refined
analysis can be used to show that O(m log(1/δ)) iterations will suffice, but this does not
matter much for our final application and so we use the cruder bound of m/δ.)
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4.2 On the Impossibility of Authenticating Functions
Theorem 21 tells that for every first-order boolean function which can be computed by a decision
tree of low depth, there exist relatively few of its coordinates that, once fixed, determine the
function’s output with very high probability. If N is exponentially larger than q, in particular
there is no hope for such a function to be a secure message authentication code. In this section, we
aim at exploiting all this to prove that higher-order authentication is not possible if the argument
function has too large a domain. In order to do it, we build a third-order randomized algorithm,
which will be shown to fit into the our game-theoretic framework.
More specifically, we are concerned with the cryptographic properties of strategies for the
parametrized game SOF q,r,p =!q(S[r]( B)( S[p] and, in particular, with the case in which r is
the identity ι, i.e. we are considering the game LINSOF q,p = SOF q,ι,p. Any such strategy, when
deterministic, can be seen as computing a family of functions {Fn}n∈N where Fn : (S[n] → B) →
S[p(n)]. How could we fit all this into the hypotheses of Theorem 21?
The definitions of variance, influence, and decision tree can be easily generalised to functions in
the form F : (S[N ]→ B)→ S[M ]. Of course the underlying distribution D must be a distribution
over functions S[N ]→ B. The parameter N can be fixed in such a way that n < N < 2n, where n
is the security parameter. For simplicity we will choose N to be a power of 2, which hence divides
2n. In other words, N = 2p, where p is strictly between log2(n) and n. Eventually we will set N
to be some large enough polynomial in n, i.e., p will be in the form a · log2(n) + b.
Definition 23 (Extension). For every x ∈ S[N ], we define the extension of x, denoted by fx
as the function fx : S[n] → B such that for every i ∈ [2n] (identifying S[n] with the numbers
{0, . . . , 2n− 1} in the natural way), it holds that fx(i) = xbi/Nc+1. That is, fx is the function that
outputs x1 on the first N inputs, outputs x2 on the second N inputs, and so on and so forth. If
F : (S[n] → B) → B is a function, then we define F˜ : S[N ] → B as follows: for every x ∈ S[N ],
F˜ (x) = F (fx). Given a distribution D over S[N ], a distribution over functions S[n] → B can be
formed in the natural way as fD.
We will also make use of the following slight variation on the classic notion of Hamming
distance: define H(·, ·) to be the so-called normalized Hamming distance. In fact, we overload
the symbol H and use it for both strings in S[N ] and functions in S[n] → X for some set
X. That is, if x, y ∈ {0, 1}N then H(x, y) = Prj∈[N ][xj 6= yj ] while if f , g ∈ S[n] → X then
H(f , g) = Pri∈S[n][f(i) 6= g(i)]. We use the following simple lemma
Lemma 24. For every x, y ∈ S[N ], H(fx, fy) = H(x, y)
Proof. If we choose i ∈ S[n] then (identifying S[n] with {0, . . . 2n − 1}), since N divides 2n, the
distribution bi/Nc is uniform over {0, . . . ,N − 1} and so the two probabilities in the definition of
the Hamming distance are the same. More formally:
H(fx, fy) = Pr
i∼S[n]
[fx(i) 6= fy(i)] =
∑
i∈S[n]
1
2n
|fx(i)− fy(i)|
=
∑
i∈S[n]
1
2n
∣∣xbi/Nc+1 − ybi/Nc+1∣∣ = 2n−p ∑
j∈[N ]
1
2n
|xj − yj |
=
∑
j∈[N ]
1
2p
|xj − yj | = Pr
j∼[N ]
[xj 6= yj ] = H(x, y).
The game T[q] is a slight variation on S[q] in which the returned string is in a ternary alphabet
{0, 1,⊥}. Any strategy for T[q] can be seen as representing a (family of) partial functions from
[q(n)] to B.
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Theorem 25. For every ε, δ > 0, there is a polytime probabilistic strategy infvarε,δ on the game
!s(LINSOF q,p) ( T[t] such that for every deterministic strategy f on LINSOF q,p computing
{Fn}n∈N, the composition f; infvarε,δ, with probability at least 1 − δ, computes some functions
gn : [t(n)]→ B such that VarfUgn (Fn) ≤ ε and |Dom(gn)| ≤ O(p(n)q2(n)/(δ)).
Proof. Please observe that F˜ is a function from S[N ] to S[L] which, since F is computable by a
decision tree of depth q, can be computed itself by a decision tree of the same depth. The result
follows by just looking at the function F˜ and applying to it Theorem 21. Actually, the queries
that algorithm A makes to F˜ correctly translate into queries of the form fi = fxi .
Remarkably, the strategy infvarε,δ is that it infers the “influential variables” of the strategy
with which it interacts without looking at how the latter queries its argument function, something
which would anyway be available in the history of the interaction.
We can now obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 26. For every δ there is a polytime probabilistic strategy collδ on a game !s(LINSOF q,p)(
(S[ι] ( B) ⊗ (S[ι] ( B) such that for every deterministic strategy f on LINSOF q,p computing
{Fn}n∈N, the composition f; collδ, with probability at least 1 − δ, computes two function families
g,h with gn,hn : S[n]→ B such that
1. H(gn,hn) ≥ 0.1
2. Fn(gn) = Fn(hn).
3. For every function f on which collδ queries its argument, it holds that H(f , gn) ≥ 0.1 and
H(f ,hn) ≥ 0.1.
This shows that coll finds a collision for Fn as a pair of functions that are different from each
other (and in fact significantly different in Hamming distance) but for which Fn outputs the same
value, and hence F cannot be a collision-resistant hash function. Moreover, because the functions
are far from those queried, this means that Fn cannot be a secure message authentication code
either, since by querying Fn on gn, the adversary can predict the value of the tag on hn.
Proof. We run the algorithm of Theorem 25 and obtain a partial function g such that |S(g)| ≤
10Lq2/(δ2) and such that the variance of every one of the functions F1,F2, . . . ,FL is smaller than
δ. We choose N to be large enough so that the bound 10Lq2/(δ2) on |S(g)| is smaller than
δN/100. Once we achieve this, we sample x′ and x′′ independently from Ug and set g = fx′ and
h = fx′′ . Since we fixed only a 0.01δ fraction of the coordinates, and x
′ and x′′ are random over
the remaining ones, using the standard Chernoff bounds with high probability g and h will differ
on at least 1 − 2−L − δ/10 fraction of the remaining coordinates from each other and also from
all other previous queries. (Specifically, the probability of the difference being smaller than this
is exponentially small in δN and we can make N big enough so that this is much smaller than
δ/(Lm) and so we can take a union bound on all queries.) On the other hand, because of the
variance, the probability that Fi(g) 6= Fi(h) for every i is less than δ/L and so we can take a union
bound over all L i’s to conclude that G(g) = G(h) with probability at least 1− δ.
4.3 A Positive Result on Higher-Order Pseudorandomness
We conclude this paper by giving a positive result. More specifically, we prove that pseudoran-
domness can indeed be attained at second order, but at an high price, namely by switching to
the type LOGSOF p = SOF ι,dlge,p. This indeed has the same structure of LINSOF q,p, but the
argument function takes in input strings of logarithmic size rather than linear size. Moreover, the
argument function can be accessed a linear number of times, which is enough to query it on every
possible coordinate.
The fact that that a strategy on LOGSOF p can query its argument on every possible coordinate
renders the attacks described in the previous section unfeasible. Actually, LOGSOF p can be seen
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as an interactive variation of the game S[ι] ( S[p], for which pseudorandomness is well known
to be attainable starting from standard cryptographic assumptions [11]: simply, instead of taking
in input the whole string at once, it queries it bit by bit, in a certain order. A random strategy of
that type, then, would be one that, using the notation from Figure 2,
• Given t1, . . . , ti ∈ B, returns a string si+1 uniformly chosen at random from S[r(n)] −
{s1, . . . , si}, this for every i < q(n).
• Moreover, based on t1, . . . , tr(n), the strategy produces a string v chosen uniformly at random
from S[p(n)].
Please notice that this random strategy can be considered as a random functionals in (S[r(n)]→
B) → S[p(n)] only if r(n) is logarithmic, because this way the final result v is allowed to depend
on the value of the input function in all possible coordinates. The process of generating such a
random strategy uniformly can be seen1 as a probabilistic strategy randsof.
We are now ready to formally define pseudorandom functions:
Definition 27 (Second-Order Pseudorandom Function). A deterministic polytime strategy f on
S[ι] ( LOGSOF p is said to be pseudorandom iff for every probabilistic polytime strategy A on
!sLOGSOF p( B there is a negligible function ε : N→ R[0,1] such that
|Pr(!s(mult; f);A ⇓n 1)− Pr(!srandsof;A ⇓n 1)| ≤ ε(n)
The way we will build a pseudorandom function consists in constructing a deterministic
polytime strategy first2second for the following game !ι+1(L[ι] ( S[w]) ( LOGSOF p, where
w ∈ Pol is such that w ≥ dlge and w ≥ p. The way the strategy is defined is in Figure 4.
!ι+1(L[ι]( S[w]) ( !ι(S[dlge]( B) ( S[p])
O ?S[p]
.
.
.
P (i, ?S[w])
O (i, ?L[ι])
P (i, (z1 · · · zi−1)
O (i, ji))
P (i, ?B)
O (i, ?S[dlge])
P (i,α(ji, {j1, . . . , ji−1})
O (i, zi)
.
.
.
P (n, ?S[w])
O (n, ?L[ι])
P (n, (z1 · · · zn))
O (n, v)
P β(v)
Figure 4: Plays in first2second
The function α interprets its first
argument (a string in S[w(n)]), as
an element of S[dlge(n)] different
from those it takes as second argu-
ment, and distributing the proba-
bilities uniformly. The function β,
instead, possibly discards some bits
of the input and produces a possi-
bly shorter string.
The way the strategy first2second
is defined so as to be such that
f; first2second is statistically very
close to the random strategy when-
ever f is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom among the strategies for the
parametric game L[ι] ( L[w].
This allows us to prove the follow-
ing:
Theorem 28. Let F : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}≤n → {0, 1}w(n) be a pseudo-
random function and let fF be the deterministic polytime strategy for the game S[ι](!ι+1(L[ι](
S[w]) obtained from F . Then, fF ; first2second is second-order pseudorandom.
5 Related Work
Game semantics and geometry of interaction are among the best-studied program semantic frame-
works (see, e.g. [1, 13]), and can also be seen as computational models, given their operational
1the strategy at hand would, strictly speaking, need exponentially many random bits, which are not allowed in
our model.
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flavor. This is particularly apparent in the work on abstract machines [6, 9], but also on the
so-called geometry of synthesis [10]. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the latter
use of game semantics, and take it as the underlying computational model. Our game model is
definitionally strongly inspired by Wolverson [21]: the main novelty with respect to the latter is
the treatment of randomized strategies, and the bounded exponential construction, which together
allows us to account for efficient randomized higher-order computation.
This is certainly not the first paper in which cryptography is generalized to computational
models beyond the one of first-order functions. One should of course cite Canetti’s universally
composable security [3], but also Mitchell et al.’s framework, the latter based on process alge-
bras [17]. None of them deals with the security of higher-order functions, though.
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